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ABSTRACT 
 
A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF INTER-KOREAN 
TRANSBOUNDARY RIVERS 
By 
Sung-Yun Kim 
 
The purpose of this paper is to establish a management strategy for the reasonable and 
equitable utilization of the inter-Korean transboundary rivers through the case of the 
Imnam Dam on the Bukhan River and the Hwanggang Dam on the Imjin River. As a 
methodology, game theoretic approach was deployed to explore a solution to the 
problems of the transboundary rivers between North Korea and South Korea. This paper 
makes reasonable assumptions about the factors surrounding the transboundary rivers 
to calculate two Koreas’ payoffs respectively, models the process of negotiations 
between the two Koreas as a sequential move game in which South Korea moves first 
and North Korea acts next, and analyzes subgame perfect Nash equilibrium according 
to the flow allocation scenarios. The compensation for North Korea, which is calculated 
under the assumption as mentioned above, is not sufficient to make North Korea accept 
the South Korea’s proposal. Therefore, this paper suggests not only a new cooperation 
project in the water resources field to fill the gap of North Korea’s payoff, but also takes 
some measures into account in order to ensure the South Korea's investment recovery 
during the implementation of the project. 
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I. Introduction 
Water is a valuable resource for improving the quality of life and developing the 
national economy. Accordingly, water issues are a matter of concern among regions, 
countries, and even the entire world. Besides, water is a rare, valuable resource and 
does not distinguish the territorial borders. Sometimes, those characteristics of water 
become the reasons conflicts can arise over the use of the transboundary rivers (Barrett 
1994).  
North Korea, which occupies the upper reaches of the Bukhan River and the 
Imjin River, unilaterally built the Imnam Dam and the Hwanggang Dam respectively 
that have diverted the river flow into other watersheds to get more hydroelectricity (Ahn 
et al. 2011). According to the Long-term Comprehensive Plan (MOLIT 2011), the 
inflow of the Hwacheon Dam, located at the downstream of the Bukhan River, was 
estimated to decrease by 1.29 billion m3 per year after the construction of the Imnam 
Dam. The plan also reported that the construction of the Hwanggang Dam brought 
about a decrease of 0.94 billion m3 per year in the Imjin River basin, deteriorating the 
downstream water quality and diminishing potential production of fish stocks. South 
Korea has much difficulty in water supply and river management, such as water 
shortage in dry seasons and sudden water upsurge in rainy seasons (Korea Environment 
Institute 2010). This culminated in a disaster in September 2009 with six South Korean 
casualties and about 143 million KRW property damage, caused by North Korea’s 
sudden discharge of the Hwanggang Dam without any notification in advance (Baek 
2016). 
The problem of inter-Korean water cooperation requires mutual cooperation, 
but the two Koreas would not cooperate unless the results of the cooperation between 
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the two Koreas are more beneficial to themselves than those obtained when they do not 
cooperate. It is because both South Korea and North Korea are individual decision-
makers with the power to decide whether to cooperate or not by themselves. Therefore, 
in order for the two Koreas to cooperate, the strategy of cooperation should be a Nash 
equilibrium of the non-cooperative game, where South Korea and North Korea are 
players. The problem is which kind of games the Nash equilibrium is for. To begin with, 
it should be decided whether this game, where the two Koreas determine whether to 
cooperate or not in the water resources field, is going to be modeled as a simultaneous 
move game or sequential move game, in which one of the two Koreas first suggests and 
the other reacts for the offer. This paper attempts to model and analyze this situation as 
a sequential move game with the assumption that South Korea will lead water 
cooperation projects between the two Koreas. In other words, this paper explores the 
Nash equilibrium by modeling this situation as a sequential move game, where South 
Korea moves first to suggest to North Korea the flow allocation of the transboundary 
rivers and inter-Korean water resources cooperation projects, and North Korea moves 
next to find its best response for South Korea’s suggestion. Therefore, not a simple 
Nash equilibrium, but a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that is stronger than a Nash 
equilibrium is going to be deployed. 
II. Problem Definition 
A transboundary river is a river that runs continuously across national 
boundaries (Lee 2017). The International Law Association (ILA) defines a 
transboundary river as a river that includes not only land and underground water but 
also the geographic range determined by watersheds, extending to more than two 
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countries' territory and sharing a common downstream. This reflects the need to 
coordinate water resource conflicts among countries through the internationalization of 
the rivers and effectively regulate environmental pollution by grasping the geographical 
scope of the transboundary rivers broadly. There are the Bukhan River and the Imjin 
River in the Han River basin, which are national rivers.  
The peaceful use of the transboundary rivers between the two Koreas has 
following advantages: (1) it promotes the development of inter-Korean relations by 
preventing military conflict from the perspective of the peace community and 
prompting exchanges and cooperation through the transboundary rivers; (2) it 
contributes to the formation of an inter-Korean economic community; (3) it contributes 
to the formation of an ethnic community by recovering the homogeneity of the people 
in Korean Peninsula through preserving and co-managing natural ecosystems, 
excavating and restoring cultural and historical resources in the transboundary river 
basin (Lee 2011). 
The Bukhan River is the first tributary of the Han River, with a watershed area 
of 10,834.8 km2, about 41 % of the Han River’s. Among them, the watershed area of 
North Korea is 3,901 km2, about 58.5 % of the Bukhan River’s. The Bukhan River 
originates from Danbalryeong (1,241 m above sea level) near Kumgang Mountain in 
Gangwon Province, North Korea, flows southward through Faro Lake, Chuncheon 
Lake and Uiam Lake, and joins the Soyang River. The Imnam Dam in North Korea is 
located at about 60 km upstream of the Hwacheon Dam, and there is a reservoir dam in 
the upper stream of the dam with a basin area of 244 km2. North Korea has diverted the 
river flow to the East Coast in this dam, and is generating hydroelectric power at the 
Anbyon Youth Power Plant. 
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The Imjin River originates from the southern valley of Duryu Mountain in 
Gangwon Province, North Korea, flows southward into Gyeonggi Province, South 
Korea, joins the Hantan River, and then meets mainstream of the Han River. The total 
watershed area of the Imjin River is 8,117.5 km2, out of which North Korea occupies 
62.9 %, 5,108.8 km2, and South Korea occupies 37.1 %, 3,008.7 km2. The upstream is 
mountainous, and most of the mainstream and tributaries form rapid streams. As it 
flows to the downstream, it becomes gentle and a relatively wide plain is formed in the 
lowlands of Paju and Munsan area. 
There are two fundamental points for an objective discussion on the issue of the 
transboundary rivers between the two Koreas. The first is that the transboundary river 
problems, in which the upstream and downstream areas are clearly separated by borders, 
are fundamentally unsettled by measures taken by only one of the two Koreas, 
especially the downstream ones. The second is that there is no official international law 
or mechanism to co-ordinate or resolve disputes between the two Koreas on the 
transboundary rivers. When social interests were focused on this issue in the past, some 
people argued that South Korea should sue North Korea to the international 
organizations. However, since both South Korea and North Korea have not signed 
international UN conventions, the United Nations is unlikely to intervene on this issue 
unless both of the two Koreas bring suit cases against each other to the UN for the 
transboundary river problems. 
In 1997, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational 
uses of International Watercourses presented the basic principles and directions for the 
joint management of the transboundary rivers that have been discussed internationally. 
However, this agreement is not a compulsory regulation that each country has to obey 
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mandatorily. A State becomes a compulsory country only after signing and ratifying 
this Convention, and the two Koreas are not included in the list of the compulsory 
countries. In the end, the issues of the transboundary rivers between the two Koreas 
cannot help but to be solved through negotiation and cooperation between the parties. 
Considering only the transboundary river problem, South Korea located in the 
downstream is always in a disadvantageous position due to unidirectionality, and 
becomes more and more disadvantageous over time. 
Historically, one of the things accepted important in the use of inter-country or 
inter-regional transboundary rivers is customary water use or prescriptive water rights. 
In other words, the behavior of river use that has been accepted for a long time is 
respected. 
The Bukhan River and the Imjin River have inter-Korean conflict factors. The 
transboundary rivers in the upstream located in North Korea have high runoff 
coefficient because the rivers flow along rugged mountain canyons. Therefore, the flow 
rate increases rapidly in the case of heavy rain, which can result in flood damage in the 
middle and downstream areas. 
For example, North Korean forests located in the upstream of the Bukhan River 
are devastated, which may make flood damage propagate to the Seoul metropolitan area 
when the discharge of the Imnam Dam is implemented during heavy rain. In addition, 
after the construction of the Imnam Dam in North Korea, the annual inflow amount of 
the Bukhan River decreased by 1.29 billion m3/yr, and the South Korea is suffering 
from a decrease in hydroelectric power generation water and river maintenance water, 
a change in the environment, and deterioration in water quality. Especially, Sunwoo 
(1986) estimated that the 370 MW/day of the total power generated by the five 
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consecutive hydroelectric power plants, located at the downstream of the Bukhan River, 
would diminish by 104 MW/day (28.2%) if the upstream inflow is blocked after the 
construction of the dam. 
On the other hand, the Imjin River had severe flood damages in the middle and 
downstream areas because of heavy rain in the past, and the downstream of the Imjin 
River is in danger of flooding the surrounding area as the level of the riverbed rises 
because the sediments from the middle and upper stream accumulate. Moreover, North 
Korea constructed the Hwanggang Dam and diverted the river flow of the Imjin River 
to the Yesung River to get more hydroelectric power, resulting in a 0.94 billion m3/yr 
decrease in annual inflow. During the dry seasons, the decrease in the flow rate of the 
river becomes severe, which causes side effects such as seawater infiltration and 
ecosystem disturbance in the downstream, and it may threaten the agricultural water 
supply for Yeoncheon and Paju region. Particularly, due to the discharge of the 
Hwanggang Dam in the case of heavy rain, flood damage is more likely to occur in 
such downstream area as Yeoncheon, Paju, etc. This culminated in a disaster in 
September 2009 with six South Korean casualties and about 143 million KRW property 
damage, caused by North Korea’s sudden discharge of the Hwanggang Dam without 
any notification in advance (Baek 2016). To prevent this situation from happening, 
South Korea constructed Gunnam Flood Control Dam in the Imjin River and 
Hantangang Flood Control Dam in the Hantan River, the tributary of the Imjin River 
(Lee et al. 2008). 
As mentioned above, there have been several cases of conflicts between the two 
Koreas due to the different viewpoint in the transboundary river use and management. 
South Korea located in the downstream of the transboundary rivers has been unable to 
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slow down the concerns and tensions about the transboundary rivers. In 2000, the South 
Korean government tried to cooperate with the North Korean government in the Imjin 
River Flood Prevention Project to mitigate the transboundary river conflicts between 
them. At the second inter-Korean ministerial talks (August 2000, Pyongyang), the 
North agreed to the Imjin River Flood Prevention Project, which made the cooperation 
atmosphere boom. Since then, in the Imjin River Flood Prevention Working Group and 
the Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Committee, agreements for the Imjin River 
Flood Prevention, inter-Korean joint investigation, provision of equipment and 
provision of measurement data have been discussed many times, but there has been no 
real achievement. In the 13th Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation Promotion 
Committee (April 2007, Pyongyang), an attempt was made to adopt a consent form for 
the supply of equipment and the cooperation of local visits and technical support, but it 
did not succeed neither. In September 2009, the Imjin River accident that caused six 
South Korean casualties occurred, and in October of the same year, the Imjin River 
Flood Prevention Practical Meeting was held. At this time, the North expressed its 
condolences due to the accident in Imjin River and agreed to give advance notice to 
prevent accidents from recurring in the future. Through the talks, North Korea agreed 
to discuss the next round of talks on the prevention of floods and the shared use of inter-
Korean transboundary rivers, but it did not lead to concrete consultations. Until now, 
the Imjin River Flood Prevention Project is the only cooperation project, but as 
mentioned above, the Imjin River Flood Prevention Project has only been agreed upon, 
and concrete discussions and implementations for establishing practical measures have 
not been made yet. 
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III. Literature Review 
South Korea, which is geographically located in the downstream of the 
transboundary rivers, is suffering from the various problems caused by North Korea’s 
unilateral use of water resources in the upstream region (Korea Environment Institute 
2010). In the case of conflicts involving the transboundary rivers, there are no 
universally accepted principles (Korea Institute for National Unification 2006). 
Therefore, constant consultation between the two Koreas is required to solve these 
issues. Nevertheless, the inter-Korean cooperation on the transboundary rivers has been 
much influenced by the political and military situations, although the cooperation on 
the water resources has the high feasibility in ecological, economic, and technological 
fields excluding the ideology and politics (Korea Institute for National Unification 
2006). As can be seen from the cases of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mt. 
Kumgang Project, North Korea has shown an active attitude toward the cooperation 
that is practically beneficial to itself (Lee et al. 2008). Therefore, this paper makes an 
effort to estimate the monetary value of the additional water that North Korea were to 
furnish, explore the new projects that South Korea would provide North Korea with as 
a compensation. 
A. The Cooperation Projects concerned with the Korean Transboundary Rivers 
The Korea Institute for National Unification (2006) suggested that it is 
necessary to distinguish between short, mid and long-term projects according to the 
feasibility and urgency of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation on the 
transboundary rivers.  
For the short term projects, it would be desirable to commence the cooperation 
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that the two Koreas have already agreed upon, but have not yet implemented, for 
example the basic co-research on the transboundary rivers, the formation of a 
meteorological observation network, the establishment of a transboundary river 
cooperation committee, and a joint disaster prevention (Korea Institute for National 
Unification 2006). 
As for the mid and long term projects, the following can be found in the 
literature. According to the Hyundai Research Institute (2006), the aggregate reserves 
of the Imjin River estuary are estimated to be 1.08 billion m3. The dredging work to 
collect the sand in the region not only makes it possible to meet the annual total demand 
of the Seoul metropolitan area of 45 million m3 for 25 years, but also helps prevent the 
flood damage in the downstream area of the Imjin River, which is occurring repeatedly 
in every summer, because the water level of the Han River estuary is reduced by about 
1 m. The Korea Institute for National Unification (2006) suggested reforestation, the 
cooperation on water resources and ecosystem management and conservation. In order 
to solve the electric power shortage of North Korea caused by water supply to South 
Korea, Lee et al. (2008) suggested several models, such as the installation support of 
pumping-up power plant facilities in North Korea and the renovation of existing 
outdated hydroelectric dam facilities. 
B. Game Theory in Water Conflicts 
A variety of approaches based on the economic theory have been made to the 
transboundary river problem, and one of the typical methods is game theory. John von 
Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern first introduced formally the game theory in their 
book published in 1944, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Teasley 2009). 
Game theory analyzes the conflict and cooperation among players mathematically 
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(Madani 2010). It explores strategies for players who participate in the game to predict 
their costs and profits from the decisions made by the other players and to determine 
the best response they can take based on their predictions (Teasley 2009). The game 
theoretical approach to the transboundary rivers has been set up and analyzed as a non-
cooperative game in order to study the counter-strategies for confrontation and conflict. 
There have been many cases which adopted non-cooperative game theory to include 
unidirectional externalities in the modeling (Barrett 1994). Madani (2010) examined 
whether game theory can be applied to water management and dispute resolution by 
using a series of non-cooperative water resources games, and explained that considering 
evolution path of the game is important during the research on the dynamic structure of 
water resources. Eleftheriadou et al. (2008) quantified the consequences of flow 
reduction, according to the various scenarios by using the concept of game theory in a 
case study of Greek-Bulgarian negotiations on Nestos/Mesta transboundary rivers, and 
provided a background for preparing the compromise measures acceptable to both 
countries. The authors also argued that linking other issues irrelevant to water resources 
games could broaden the available options of the nation and avoid the unreasonable 
consequences of "power" unbalance. According to the study conducted by Just and 
Netanyahu in 1998 (as cited in Eleftheriadou and Mylopoulos 2008), negotiation 
sometimes leads to the dominance of a strong player due to the severe asymmetry 
between the parties, and the concept of equity is easily ignored. In such a case, it may 
be beneficial for weak players to integrate the other issues. As for inter-Korean 
transboundary rivers, Choi and Lee (2008) applied the cooperative game theory 
approach to the Bukhan River to quantify the conditions of cooperation and reward for 
the best mutual benefit of the two Koreas. 
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No research has been found that employs an analytical method, which this paper 
will use, to model conflicts and cooperations on the transboudary rivers as a sequential 
move game and seek subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
IV. Model and Equilibrium 
A. Modeling the Games 
This papers models the situation surrounding the cooperation between South 
Korea and North Korea about the water resources belonging to the Bukhan River and 
the Imjin River as a sequential move game of complete information with the following 
characteristics. 
   Players: Players in this non-cooperative game over the transboundary rivers are 
South Korea and North Korea. A game player must have a means that can influence the 
other player’s decision, and make negotiation and coordination possible. In the case of 
the inter-Korean transboundary rivers, which are clearly separated as upstream and 
downstream, the upstream nation (North Korea) has a means to adjust the flow rate, but 
the downstream nation (South Korea) has no clear means to control the activity of the 
upstream (Choi and Lee 2008).   
   Structure of the game: South Korea moves first and makes an offer to North Korea. 
North Korea observes the move by South Korea and decides whether to accept or reject 
the offer of South Korea. 
   Actions North Korea can take: South Korea offers to North Korea flow allocation 
rate for the transboundary rivers and an acceptable amount of compensation for the 
water exceeding South Korea’s prescriptive water rights (this paper estimates it as 
50 %). Besides, inter-Korean cooperation projects in water resources field and South 
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Korea’s investment recovery plan are included as part of South Korea's proposal in 
order to meet the compensation amount for North Korea. 
   Actions North Korea can take: North Korea can accept or reject South Korea's 
proposal. 
   Payoff to South Korea: The profits of hydroelectric power generation, obtained 
from the five consecutive dams in the Bukhan River as the inflow from the upstream 
increases, and the potential water usage profits, gained from the Bukhan and Imjin 
River basin, are to be calculated. Flood prevention and environmental improvement 
profits will not be taken into account because they are difficult to quantify in reality. In 
particular, South Korea pays half of the profits it gains from the water exceeding its 
prescriptive water rights as a compensation for North Korea. 
   Payoff to North Korea: The profits of hydroelectric power generation and the 
potential water usage profits in the river basins are calculated. As in South Korea, flood 
prevention and environmental improvement profits are not considered. North Korea 
receives half of the profits South Korea gains from the flow rate exceeding its 
prescriptive water rights. 
In this game model, South Korea is assumed to be the first mover. It is because 
South Korea is more economically affluent than North Korea, and it has much economic 
development experience. Therefore, it is more feasible for South Korea to establish a 
plan for economic cooperation and to suggest it to North Korea. Another reason is that 
the author approaches the issue from the standpoint of the Korea Water Resources 
Corporation, which is operated by the South Korean government, and is planning 
cooperation projects on the transboundary rivers. 
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B. The Fundamental Data and their Sources 
The figures and their sources of the basic data used to calculate the payoffs of 
the two Koreas are as follows. 
   Flow Reduction after the Construction of Imnam Dam and Hwanggang Dam 
The Long-term Comprehensive Plan (MOLIT 2011) estimated that the inflow 
of the Hwacheon Dam, located at the downstream of the Bukhan River basin, has 
decreased by 1.29 billion m3 per year because of the construction of the Imnam Dam. 
The plan also reported that the construction of the Hwanggang Dam caused a flow 
reduction of 0.94 billion m3 per year in the Imjin River basin. 
   The Unit Price of Dam Water and the Water Use Rate 
As of 2018, the unit price of dam water is 52.7 KRW/m3, which was approved 
by the Minister of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT) in accordance with 
Article 35 of the Act on the Construction of Dams and Surrounding Areas, etc., and the 
same rate is applied nationwide for balanced development of the local communities (K-
water 2018). In general, not all the water flowing in the river is used. Long-term 
Comprehensive Plan for Water Resources (MOLIT 2016) provides that the water use 
ratio to the total available runoff in South Korea is about 48.95 %. On the other hand, 
the water use ratio of North Korea is assumed to be 20 % considering that the water use 
ratio of South Korea was 23 % in the 1980’s (Choi and Lee 2008).  
   The Unit Price of Electricity 
In South Korea, alternative firepower assessment techniques are being used to 
evaluate the hydroelectric power generation benefits. However, since the privatization 
of power generation subsidiaries, Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) seems 
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to have adopted the unit price, which is used to purchase the nuclear power, as the unit 
price for evaluation. The unit price of nuclear power is 63.80 KRW/kWh, which is the 
average of the latest three year price data based on the Statistics of Electric Power in 
Korea. For reference, Table 1 shows KEPCO’s average purchase price (KRW/kWh) for 
the last three years of nuclear, LNG, combined cycle, hydro, etc. (KEPCO 2015~2017). 
Table 1. Average Purchase Price by Energy Source 
Nuclear Bituminous Domestic Coal Oil LNG Combined Cycle Hydro Pumping 
63.80 76.34 97.41 141.86 134.49 112.81 100.78 115.71 
 
   Decrease in Annual Gross Hydroelectric power Generation of South Korea 
The decrease in the annual gross hydroelectric power generation of South Korea 
is considered only in the Bukhan River basin because there is no hydroelectric power 
plant in the South Korean Imjin River basin. Sunwoo (1986) estimated that the 370 
MW per day of the total power generated by the five consecutive hydroelectric power 
plants, located at the downstream of the Bukhan River, would diminish by 104 MW per 
day (28.2 %) if the upstream inflow is blocked after the construction of the dam. 
   Annual Generation of Transboundary River Hydropower Plants in North Korea 
It is difficult to acquire accurate data on the operational status of the North 
Korean hydroelectric power plants located on the transboundary rivers. Thus, the only 
way to estimate the annual hydroelectric power generation is by using the facility 
capacities and utilization rates of the hydroelectric power plants. According to the North 
Korea Information Portal (MoU 2017), the total installed capacity of the Anbyeon 
Youth Hydropower Plant is 324 MW/day: those of the No. 1 and No. 2 power plant are 
300 MW/day and 24 MW/day respectively. Meanwhile, the Hwanggang Dam diverts 
its river flow to the Yesung River basin and there are six Yesung Youth Hydropower 
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Plants from No.1 to No.6 with the total 90 MW/day capacity (United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change 2016 as cited in Hyundai Research Institute 2016). 
Major Statistics Indicators of North Korea 2016 (Statistics Korea 2016) says 
that North Korea's hydroelectric power plant utilization rate was about 37 % in 2013 
and Kim (2018) argued that the hydroelectric power plant utilization rate in North 
Korea dropped from 41.5 % in 1990 to 31.1 % in 2016. The average utilization rate of 
North Korean hydroelectric power plants has become lower because North Korea 
cannot afford to rehabilitate the seriously deteriorating facilities. Fifty three percent of 
North Korea's hydroelectric power plants were constructed during the Japanese 
occupation, and the facilities used for more than 20 years account for 84 % of the total 
capacity (Choi and Lee 2008). Therefore, the utilization rate of the Anbyeon Youth 
Hydroelectric Power Plant and the Yesung Youth Hydroelectric Power Plant can be 
estimated to be somewhat higher than the North Korea’s average because the plants 
have been constructed relatively recently. Nonetheless, North Korea has also suffered 
from frequent breakdowns and performance deterioration of its newly built 
hydroelectric power plants owing to the lack of technological assistance from abroad 
(Kim 2018). Taking all these circumstances into account, it is assumed that the 
hydroelectric power plants generate electricity about 70 % of their facility capacity. As 
a result, the total annual hydroelectric power generation of the hydroelectric power 
plants can be calculated as about 2,538.65 GWh/year. 
C. Net Profit from Transboundary Rivers under Water Allocation Scenarios 
The payoffs of South Korea and North Korea are to be calculated according to 
the following scenarios for flow allocation of the transboundary rivers (South Korea : 
North Korea): (1) 0 : 10 (After construction of North Korean dams); (2) 5 : 5 (South 
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Korea’s prescriptive water rights); (3) 7 : 3; (4) 10 : 0 (Before construction of North 
Korean dams). 
   Before Construction of the Imnam Dam and the Hwanggang Dam 
The border areas in North Korea, located in the upstream of the Bukhan River 
and the Imjin River, were not developed until the construction of the Imnam Dam and 
the Hwanggang Dam. Therefore, the practical economic benefit of North Korea from 
those areas was insignificant. The nearby areas of the transboundary rivers had used 
little amount of water for drinking and agriculture, which caused no significant change 
in the inflow of the downstream. 
South Korea utilized the water flowing along the Bukhan River for living, 
industrial and agricultural purposes of the Seoul metropolitan area, but its significance 
in terms of water use was not so high. On the other hand, the water of the Imjin River 
was considered precious for living, industry, and agriculture. In South Korean territory 
of the downstream of the Bukhan River, there are five consecutive dams, including 
Hwacheon, Chuncheon, Uiam, Cheongpyeong and Paldang Dam. All of the dams are 
equipped with the hydroelectric power plants so that the plants generate a total of 370 
MW per day. If the inflow is cut off due to the construction of the Imnam Dam in the 
upstream of the Bukhan River, the total hydroelectric power generation will decrease 
by 104 MW per day, or 28.2 %, out of 370 MW (Sunwoo 1986). Meanwhile, no 
hydroelectric power plant is installed in the South Korean region of the Imjin River 
downstream. Therefore, the construction of the Hwanggang Dam does not affect the 
South Korean benefits from hydroelectric power generation. 
Assuming that the unit price were 63.80 KRW/kWh and 104 MW/day were 
generated, it could be seen that South Korea benefited a maximum of 581.24 hundred 
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million KRW per year from the hydroelectric power generation by using the upstream 
inflow of the Bukhan River. Choi and Lee (2008) assumed that the net profit does not 
exceed 10% of the total sales calculated based on the unit price of electric power. It is 
because in South Korea the investment compensation corresponding to the net profit 
did not exceed 6~7% of the unit price according to the past records. 
Assuming that the annual inflows of the Bukhan River and the Imjin River drop 
by 1.29 billion m3 and 0.94 billion m3 respectively (MOLIT 2011), South Korea will 
be hindered by its use of living, industrial and agricultural water. Of course, in the case 
of the Bukhan River, there is no water shortage in the Seoul metropolitan area at present 
with the entire water demand met without any severe difficulty, but the potential water 
source will be lost under a water shortage situation. On the other hand, the Imjin River 
is already experiencing serious difficulties in the management of living and agricultural 
water in the dry seasons (Baek 2009). As of the end of 2018, the price of the dam water 
is 52.70 KRW/m3 (K-water 2018). The loss due to the water blockage can be calculated 
as 1,175.21 hundred million KRW per year based on the price of the dam water, but it 
should be adjusted since generally not all the water which flows along the river is used. 
It will be about 575.27 hundred million KRW per year if 48.95 % is applied to the 
calculation, which is presented as the river water utilization rate of South Korea by 
MOLIT (2016). 
In conclusion, South Korea has benefited about 581.24 hundred million KRW 
per year by hydroelectric power generation and has secured some 575.27 hundred 
million KRW in potential benefits per year for water use. If 10% (58.12 hundred million 
KRW) of benefits from hydroelectric power generation and 100% (575.27 hundred 
million KRW) of benefits from water use are regarded as a net profit, the total benefits 
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of South Korea can be calculated as the following equation; 58.12 hundred million 
KRW + 575.27 hundred million KRW = 633.39 hundred million KRW. 
Table 2. Net Profit from Transboundary Rivers before Dam Construction (hundred million ₩/yr) 
Index Power Generation Water Use Total 
North Korea - - - 
South Korea 58.12 575.27 633.39 
 
   After Construction of the Imnam Dam and the Hwanggang Dam 
North Korea can get profit from the hydroelectric power generation and the 
potential water use by constructing the Imnam Dam and the Hwanggang Dam. In the 
previous Section, the hydroelectric power generation was estimated to be 2,538.65 
GWh/year by multiplying the facility capacities and the facility utilization rates since it 
is impossible to obtain accurate data on the electricity generation from the North Korean 
hydroelectric power plants located in the transboundary river basins. If the net profit of 
North Korea is calculated according to the exact same way to calculate South Korea's, 
it will be 161.97 hundred million KRW per year. 
Considering that the water use rate to river runoff in South Korea was 23% in 
1980, the water use rate of North Korea is assumed to be 20% of the total inflow 
blockage (Choi and Lee 2008). If 20% water use rate is applied, it can be confirmed 
that potential water use benefit is about 235.04 hundred million KRW. Consequently, 
North Korea can earn a net profit totaling 397.11 hundred million KRW annually, 
including the potential benefits of water use. 
Table 3. Net Profit from Transboundary Rivers after Dam Construction (hundred million ₩/yr) 
Index Power Generation Water Use Total 
North Korea 161.97 235.04 397.01 
South Korea - - - 
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Table 4 shows the net profits of North Korea and South Korea, according to 
various flow distribution scenarios including the above mentioned scenarios. 
Table 4. Net Profit from Transboundary Rivers under Water Allocation Scenarios (hundred million ₩/yr) 
Index Allocation Power generation Water use Payoff 
North 10 162 235 397 
South 0 - - - 
North 5 81 118 199 
South 5 29 288 317 
North 4 65 94 159 
South 6 35 345 380 
North 3 49 70 119 
South 7 41 403 443 
North 2 32 47 79 
South 8 46 460 506 
North 1 16 24 40 
South 9 52 518 570 
North 0 - - - 
South 10 58 575 633 
 
The value of water in South Korea is higher than in North Korea. In the present 
situation, in which North Korea has completely shut off the flow of water to South 
Korea through the transboundary rivers, since North Korea has a relatively larger 
capacity of hydroelectric power facilities than South Korea, the benefits of 
hydroelectric power generation are greater than that of South Korea. However, since 
the river water use rate in North Korea is significantly lower than that in South Korea, 
the benefits derived from water use are much less than those in South Korea. As a result, 
the greater the share of South Korea in the transboundary river flow, the greater the total 
profits of game players. However, in this case, North Korea cannot use the river flow 
for any purpose, including living, industrial and agricultural water use. This will not be 
acceptable to North Korea because it incurs not only the dissatisfaction of the North 
Korean people, but also the sunk cost resulting from the inability to utilize the dams 
and hydroelectric power facilities already built. Considering these situations of North 
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Korea, flow allocation of South Korea and North Korea, (7 : 3) is selected. 
Figure 1 shows an extensive form of a game, where South Korea first offers to 
North Korea the three flow allocation options: (5 : 5), (7 : 3), and (10 : 0) and North 
Korea can accept or reject it. 
 
Figure 1. Modeling the Game without Compensation 
 
To obtain the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the sequential move game 
with complete information, first move to the lowest level of the game and then select 
the optimal move from the perspective of the player who is making a decision at that 
node. After that, the optimal move is marked with an arrow and a bold line. When this 
process is completed at that level, move to the next upper level and repeat the process 
of selecting the optimal move at each node in the same manner. 
At decision node 2, North Korea chooses “Reject” because its payoff (397) 
when it selects “Reject” is larger than its payoff (199) when it selects “Accept”. North 
Korea chooses “Reject” at Decision nodes 3 and 4 for the same reason (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2. Modeling the Game without Compensation (Rollback) 
 
Now that the optimal actions for all the decision nodes at that level were selected, 
the next step is to go to the upper level, decision node 1, and then when South Korea 
chooses the optimal move among (5 : 5), (7 : 3), and (10 : 0), South Korea's payoff 
becomes 0 regardless of which one is selected. In the end, South Korea becomes 
indifferent about all the strategies South Korea can take (See Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Modeling the Game without Compensation (SPNE) 
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As can be seen in Figure 3, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that South 
Korea offers flow allocation scenarios: (5 : 5), (7 : 3), (10 : 0); North Korea chooses 
“Reject” for all those scenarios. In a sequential move game without compensation, there 
is no reason for North Korea to accept the South Korea's proposals because the payoff 
of North Korea in the status quo is greater than payoff that South Korea can offer in 
any case. 
Next, Figure 4 shows an extensive form of a game, where the two Koreas evenly 
divide South Korea’s profit gained from the additional water as a compensation. 
 
Figure 4. Modeling the Game with Compensation 
 
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, obtained through the same rollback 
process used in the previous game, is that South Korea offers flow allocation scenarios: 
(5 : 5), ( 7: 3), and (10 : 0); North Korea selects “Reject” in any case. Although North 
Korea's payoff has increased as South Korea has rewarded North Korea, in no case 
North Korea can have payoff greater than 397 which North Korea can obtain when it 
chooses “Reject” (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Modeling the Game with Compensation (SPNE) 
 
Finally, the game in case 3, where South Korea does not merely compensate for 
the excess amount over 50% of water quantity, but rather utilize the compensation 
amount to implement cooperative projects related to water resources in the North 
Korean territory, giving each country the extra profit, α, is presented in the Figure 6 as 
an extensive form. 
 
Figure 6. Modeling the Game with Inter-connected Compensation from Cooperation 
Projects 
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In order for South Korea to make North Korea, which are standing at node 3, 
select "Accept" as the optimal move, the payoff, (182+α) when North Korea chooses 
"Accept" should be equal to or greater than the payoff, (397) when North Korea chooses 
"Reject". Therefore, North Korea would choose "Accept" at node 3 when the North 
Korea's profit, α from the water resource cooperation projects is more than 21.5 billion 
KRW per year, and then South Korea selects (7 : 3) at node 1. The subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium here is that South Korea suggests (7 : 3) flow allocation with 
cooperation projects; North Korea chooses “Accept” at node 3, and chooses “Reject” 
on nodes 2 and 3 (see Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Modeling the Game with Inter-connected Compensation from Cooperation 
Projects (SPNE) 
V.  Interpretation and Policy Recommendation 
The problem between the two Koreas surrounding the transboundary rivers is 
caused by the fact that North Korea unilaterally changed the river flow to generate more 
electricity from the upstream, which has a great impact on South Korea's use of water. 
It is contrary to the international practice of the transboundary rivers that should restrict 
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such activities. The most ideal way for South Korea is that North Korea abolishes the 
watershed-modified hydroelectric power generation on the transboudary rivers and 
guarantees the same inflow to South Korea as it was before construction of the dams. 
As can be seen in Table 4, when South Korea uses all of the transboundary rivers 
flow rate, it maximizes South Korea's payoff as well as the sum of each game player's 
payoff. However, in that case, North Korea cannot cope with the future water demand, 
and the inability to use the dam and the hydroelectric facilities that already been built 
will burden North Korea additional sunk cost. Therefore, it becomes a dominated 
strategy for North Korea. A common solution in this situation is that South Korea makes 
an appropriate compensation to the North Korea, and North Korea allow a certain 
amount of water flow into South Korea through the transboundary rivers. 
What is important here is the level, method and timing of compensation. First, 
the level of compensation depends on the flow allocation rate to South Korea. Choi and 
Lee (2008) assumed that South Korea would have a prescriptive water rights of up to 
50 % of the total flow rate that had flowed to South Korea prior to the construction of 
the dams. Therefore, it is not appropriate for South Korea to compensate North Korea 
for inflow less than 50 % because it violates the principle of equitable use of the 
transboundary rivers. To put it another way, if North Korea discharges more than 50 % 
of the total flow rate to South Korea, South Korea must compensate only for the amount 
exceeding 50 %. In addition, this transaction can only be concluded if the amount of 
compensation to North Korea is greater than the profits North Korea can obtain by itself 
without complying with South Korea's proposal. 
In Chapter 4, the sequential move games, in which South Korea becomes the 
first mover, were modeled; (1) when South Korea did not compensate for the additional 
26 
 
water; (2) when South Korea simply compensates for flow rates exceeding 50 %; (3) 
when the two Koreas utilize the compensation amount for the additional water to 
implement cooperation projects and share profits. Then, the subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium was obtained in each case. As a result, it was confirmed that in case 1 and 
2, North Korea would reject any proposal from South Korea. South Korea can expect 
that North Korea will accept South Korea’s 7 : 3 water allocation proposal only when 
North Korea gains more than 21.5 billion KRW every year in case 3. 
It is important that the compensation method should provide an appropriate 
justification and a substantial benefit to both parties. The North Korean hydroelectric 
power facility modernization project, which means improving performance such as 
output and efficiency by replacing all hydroelectric power generation facilities except 
civil structure, can be suggested. North Korea has adopted self-reliance principles to 
develop its own economy without any aid from abroad. Therefore, the dependence on 
hydroelectric power in the energy sector is as high as 60 % of the total power supply. 
Nevertheless, North Korea is experiencing a great deal of difficulty in maintaining the 
hydroelectric power facilities, which makes facility utilization rates be falling 
continuously. 
The large-scale hydroelectric power plants in North Korea were built during the 
Japanese colonial period or around the Korean War with Russia’s support. At present, 
North Korea is facing serious problems on maintaining the hydroelectric power 
facilities as technical support and supply of parts are stopped from China, Russia, etc. 
The lack of parts is so serious that the North Korean engineers disassemble a normally 
operating hydroelectric power generator to take the needed parts from it and repair the 
other failed generator. This problem is also linked to the poor performance of the newly 
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constructed hydroelectric power plants. In the hydroelectric power plants built by North 
Korea with its own technology, the lack of technology not only makes the hydroelectric 
power generation of the plants less than half of the designed output, but also causes 
various technical problems (Lee et al. 2012).  
In promoting this project, South Korea must actively design investment 
reimbursement and profit sharing schemes. It is because the direct investment cost 
recovery linked to the profit structure of businesses is often difficult, given the socialist 
economy approach. Therefore, the reimbursement plan not related to the hydroelectric 
power facility modernization project should be established in economic and non-
economic way. Here, the economic way means securing the operating rights of the 
infrastructure and being exempted the South Korea-Russia Energy Infrastructure Travel 
Fares, and non-economic way means collection in the form of a political, cultural or 
social reward such as North Korea's nuclear dismantlement, regular visits of separated 
families, etc. (Kim et al. 2012).  
In the process of this project, it would be a good strategy to secure the 
sustainability of the project by deliberately motivating North Korea's allies to 
participate in the project, evolving the project into a multilateral cooperation system. 
The timing of a transaction is the most important thing. In the international 
relationships, trading with such a compensation can be facilitated if the economic gap 
between the riparian countries is greater, and the water allocation impact on their 
economy between the upstream and downstream is smaller. The greater the gap in 
economic power, the greater the difference in relative value for water use, which makes 
it easier for the countries with the superior economic power to compensate their 
counterparts for the amount to which they are acceptable. It cannot be overstated that 
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the sooner, the better to make a reasonable compromise at the present stage in which 
the difference in the economic strength of the two Koreas is large and the stress caused 
by water demand is not high in North Korea. If the situation where North Korea is 
allowed to unilaterally exploit the water of the transboundary rivers persists, South 
Korea will continue to be in a more and more unfavorable position (Choi and Lee 2008). 
VI. Conclusion 
The most desirable solution for the transboundary river management is for the 
riparian countries to conclude agreements on the equitable and rational use of the rivers 
in accordance with the principles of the international law, and to create watershed 
communities. As a result, the riparian countries can use and manage the water 
efficiently under the condition that they do not harm the health of the river environment. 
However, if the reliance on the transboundary rivers is high, the management criteria 
are determined mainly by the riparian countries’ concern, power, and closeness among 
themselves rather than the international customs or principles. Therefore, it is more 
realistic and reasonable to attempt to solve the transboundary river problems by 
analyzing them through game theory rather than approaching them in accordance with 
the international law or the water right principles. The same is true for the problems of 
the inter-Korean transboundary rivers. It would be only a diplomatic rhetoric to 
emphasize the principles of the international laws under the present condition that there 
is no agreement, treaty, or consent to control the North Korea's unilateral exploitation 
of the transboundary rivers. Therefore, the game-theoretic approach based on economic 
interests is the most persuasive approach to the inter-Korean transboundary river 
problems, considering the present situation that full-scale inter-Korean exchanges have 
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yet to occur. For this reason, this paper has tried to solve the transboundary river 
problems between the two Koreas through the approach of non-cooperative game 
theory. More specifically, this paper makes reasonable assumptions about the factors 
involved in inter-Korean water cooperation surrounding the transboundary rivers; 
models the process of negotiations between the two Koreas as a sequential move game 
in which South Korea moves first; and analyzes each subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
according to the flow allocation scenarios. The compensation amount of the additional 
water that North Korea would provide was calculated, but it was confirmed that this 
calculated amount alone does not provide sufficient incentive to make North Korea 
accept the South Korean proposal. Therefore, this paper suggests a plan to jointly 
implement a new project where the two Koreas can cooperate with each other in the 
field of water resources instead of simple monetary compensation, and to share the 
benefits derived therefrom equally. The modernization project of North Korea’s 
outdated hydroelectric power facilities is suggested as an example of a new cooperation 
project, and the measures to ensure the South Korea's investment recovery during the 
implementation process is also taken into account. 
In the future, it will be necessary to prepare for the era of cooperation between 
the two Koreas in the field of water resources by continuing more study based on the 
game structure of this paper about the diversified models of games; where North Korea 
becomes the first mover; where the bargaining power between the two Koreas is equal; 
where a Bayesian equilibrium should be considered because there is an information 
asymmetry between the two Koreas; and so on. 
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